Contractual Obligations

The vast majority of obligations take the form of contract between the parties, thus we will discuss formation of contract, what constitutes a contract obligation and what does not.

Formation of a contrast :

The contract is the final outcome of an offer and acceptance, it may be preceded by various negotiations, but there is no real contract unless there is total agreement between the offer and acceptance and unless every party complies with all the terms of the contract proposed.

A contract creates rights & liabilities. It may even be considered a form of property, in that the rights & Liabilities resulting from a contract can sometimes be transferred to third persons and may pass involuntarily as a matter of law on the death or bankruptcy of the party concemed.

Contracts may also give rise to obligations of trust as for ex-duties of an excutor on payment certain fees & expenses or where one person agreco to act as the agent of another.

A contract may produce consequences so far as the laws of tort is concerned, since to procure a breach of contract (and possibly in modern times to interfere with its proper performance or even to

prevent its being made). Is an actionable wrong. 30 Thus the concept of contract is central in modern

law & the law of contract has very close ve relationships with other branches of law. 

A contract as stated before is the final outcome of total agreement between offer and acceptance, here we discuss what forms an offer and what constitutes an acceptance.

Offer:

Offer defined "an offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it "An offer to be capable of acceptance, must involve a definite promise by the offerer that he will bind himself if the exact terms specified by him are accepted. If an offer takes the form of a promise in return for an act the performance of the act in itself is an adequate indication of assent.

Acceptance :

Acceptance of an offer consists of a declaration communicated by any means whatever it may be to the offerer. noy Acceptance may also consist of the dispatch of the goods or of the price or of any other act which

the may be considered to be equivalent to declaration referred to either by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have established between themselves or usage.

When does and acceptance operate to form a contract? the basic rule is that the contract is formed by dispatch. The offerer may be allowed the right to condition his offer. In particular he may provide that the contract becomes effective only upon the double condition that the acceptance be communicates to him and that he has not revoked the offer in the meantime. This condition may be imposed upon the acceptor either by virute of the offer or as a term of the conditional contract which is being created by dispatch of the acceptance. the absence of a stepulation to the contrary, contract whether inter presents or inter absents, is fouund at the time and at the place of the dispatch of the acceptance. When the offer is accepted tacitly, the contract is considered formed at the time and place where the acceptor received the offer.

Considération:

A promise not made by deed is not enforceable by action unless it is made for valuable consideration.

If by deed promises to give $50 may enforce the promise. If by word of mouth or in writing. A promises to give $ 20 cannot enforce the promise. It is not and enforceable contract but a gratutitous promise. But suppose A offers to pay B $ if B will in return deliver to A a certain horse, then if B accepts the offer and delivers the horse A. is under a contractual obligation to pay: over $50 in return. The delivery of the horse is said to be the consideration for A's promise.

Consideration must be something of value which the promisee contributes to the bargain, so as to bind the promisor to his promise. It is not sufficient that the promisor is under some moral obligation to the promise and that his promise is to fulfill that obligation.

Nature of consideration :

A valuable consideration may consist either in some rights, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the one party.or in some forbearance, detriment, loss of responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.

Contracts void & voidable :

A contract though valid may be annulled at the instance of a parity who gives consent to it. On the ground of want of capacity. If he gives it in mistake provided that the error was of the kind described here. If he was induced to consent by deceit by the other party or to which such party was privy. If he was coerced into the contact by duress or violence Mistake, dureas or fraud are commonly spoken of as the vices of consent. It is likewise true that a party to a contract cannot get it annulled on the ground of his fraud or violence. In an Egyptian case, a wanted to borrow money from B. B. said he would lend it only on condition that A signed a deea to a certain effect. A pretended to sign, but instead of writing his name he wrote in Hebrew letters which B could not read words equivalent to

declares he does not accept . It was held that A was found in spite of his fraud. Yet the fact that the obligation of one party is annulled on the ground that he did not give a valid consent does not affect his validity on the obligations of the other party.

Acts voidable are valid at first and produce legal effects, but are liable to be challenged and annulled.

Characteristics of void contracts

 1. It can never produce any legal effect.. Thus when

its validity is inquired into by a court, the court deoes not annul it, but simply declines to recognize its existence.

2. Any person having an interest may claim that the void contract produces no effect.

3. No confirmation by the parties can gave validity to it

4. It cannot acquire validity by prescription.

Characteristics of viodable contracts:

1. Those made by an incapable person, unless his incapacity was absolute as in the case of a lunatic or a baby.

2. Those made by an incapable person, whose

consent was given in mistake, was induced by fraud or was the effect of duress . The party protected has a right to ask that it should be annulled under these rules.

3. The contract is perfectly valid to begin with &

produces its legal effects.

4. The action to have it annulled is competent only

to the party protected.

5. If the person who has the right to attack the

cotract confirms it. It produces its effect.

6. If the challenge is not made within a certain

period the fight to challenge is lost by prescription 10 years in the French code, but

according to general rules in Egyptian 15 years. 7. If the contract is annulled the parties are put

back to the same position as if the contract had never been made. This rule is subject to two

qualification in Egypt & France: a. When it is an incapable person who gets the contract set aside for his incapacity, he is liable only to account for so much as to have insured to his benefit in consequence to the performance

of the contract..

b. The person who has received a thing under the tol contract and possessed it in good faith does not need to account for the fruits.

Minors contracts :

The law governing infants contracts is based on two principles. The first and more important is that the law must protect infants against their inexperience. This makes it necessary to invalidate contracts which are unfair to the infant or though in themselves fair are simply improvident e.g. (if the infant for a fair price buys something that he cannot afford).

The second principle is that the law should not cause unnecessary hardships to adults who deal fairly with infants. Under this principle certain contracts with infants are valid others are voidable in the sense that they bind the infant unless he repudiates & an infant may be under some liability in tort , quasi-contract and if guilty of fraud in equity

At common law a person who spends money in luying necessaries for an necessaries for an infant is entitled to recover it form the infant. One who lends money to an infant cannot recover it at law, but can in equity recover such part of the loan as was actually used by the infant to discharge his liability for necessaries supplied to him. A mortgage under seal to repay such a loan is ineffective since the infant is not bound by his dead.

Performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promise if each promise is at least part of the consideration for the other and the performance of the other comment.

Ordinarily when parties make such an agreement, they not only regard the promises themselves as the subject of an exchange, but they also intend that the performance of those promises shall subsequently be exchanged for each other.

Performances need not be simultaneous. It is often expected that performances will be exchanged under an exchange of promises were though these performances are not to take place at the same time. Under a contract for the sale of goods. e.g the parties expect an exchange of the delivery of the goods by the seller & the payment of the price by the buyer regardless of whether the price is payable before, at the same time as or after delivery of the goods.

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Transfer of Obligations

The obligation being regarded as a bond between determinate persons could not be transferred so as to be available for or against others. This is still true of certain classes of rights in personam which are of so personal a nature as to be obviously available only as between the original contracting parties, e.g., many contracts of service.

Within certain limits, however, transfers of rights and liabilities were early admitted as taking place upon death, the heirs being liable for the debts of the deceased and entitled to sue for credits due to him.

The transmissibility of obligations inter vivos is, however, of greater interest for Egyptian students of European law, and it may at once he remarked that it is only slowly that such transferability has developed. The right to sue must always be carefully distinguished from liability to be sued The latter, as a general rule, cannot be transferred inter vivos, a provision easily comprehensible is generally indifferent, the personality of the debtor cons frequently the motive for the creditor's willingness to enter into the obligations.

Although the right of a creditor to assign his claim is generally admitted in modern law, such assignment is usually regarded as binding only between the assignor and assignee until notice of the assignor and assignee has been given to the debtor. The Egyptian law, following upon this point the Islamic law, is even more strict, since it does not recognize an assignment as good unless the debtor has consented.

The highest degree of transferability of rights in personam is reached in the case of negotiable instruments drawn up as evidence of a debt, and the right to receive payment of the debt is held to pass by the handing over (delivery) of the instrument with or without endorsement. The debt is identified with the document itself, so that the delivery of the instrument operates as a delivery of the debt and a consequent change of ownership. Moreover, the person who is for the time being the holder in good faith of the instrument has a right to be paid the amount due irrespective of defects in T his title to hold it. Thus, he may obtain by his possession a better title than the person from i whom he received it, just as a possessor of movables in good faith will have a good title to the nownership although the person from whom he received the thing was not really the owner. The A negotiable instrument is the product of commercial needs and the discussion of its trade uses belongs to political economy. The best-known instruments of this kind are bills of exchange. These take the form of orders drawn upon a debtor directing him to pay money to a person named or to such other person as this person may direct.

Discharge of obligations

The Egyptian code mentions seven methods by which obligations may be extinguished, namely, (2001 performance; (2) Dissolution; (3) Release; (4) Novation; (5) compensation; (6) Confusion merger; (7) Prescription A brief explanation of the meaning of these terms will suffice here.

1. Performance :

Performance consists in doing the observing the forbearances required on the person bound. In the commonest case it consists of payment of money, and it is a wellrecognized rule of Roman, French, and Egyptian law that payment may be made by some person other than the debtor and even against his wish. A third party who pays the debt may, however, obtain the right to recover the amount paid from the real debtor, so that the effect of such payment is merely. to change the person of the creditor. This right of reconrse is said to be due to subrogation. Subrogation thus causes a transfer of the creditor's rights to the person who has paid. The latter stands hence-forth in the original creditor's shoes for the purpose of obtaining payment.

2. Dissolution :

By this is meant the occurrence of some event which excuses performance and consequently dissolves the legal bond between the parties. Impossibility of performance arising subsequent to the contract will thus annual the obligation to his  perform

3. Release :

The release by the creditor of the debtor from his obligation will naturally free him from liability. The mere agreement of the parties to a discharge of the obligation has not, however, always been regarded as sufficient, since, in the case of formal contracts, it was requisite that the release to be effective should follow the same as were essential to

the creation of the obligation.

4. Novation :

Novation consists of the extinction of an obligation by the creation of a new one in its place. The creditor and debtor may, for example, annul the previous obligation by mutually agreeing to substitute a new one for it, or the creditor may agree with a third person that he shall become debtor in the place of the original debtor so that the obligation of the new debtor shall be substituted for that of the old one. ow It must be noted that the operation known as  novation differs radically from transfer of an obligation, though in some of its forms it appears to produce similar results. Novation involves a new obligation which is substituted for the old one; transfer, on the other hand, keeps the old . obligation on foot, merely altering the persons who

are bound by it.

5. Compensation.

The English word "compensation is here used as equivalent to the French compensation.

Compensation extinguishes debts by the mutual setting off of the liabilities of each party against one another. In French and Egyptian law it - operates by effect of law (de plein driot) even without the knowledge of the parties, the two debts canceling each other rateably from the moment at which they co-exist.

6- Confusion :

Where a person unites in himself the two capacities of creditor and debtor the obligation is said to be extinguished by merger. The French term is confusion, and in the English translation the Egyptian code the English word "confusion" is used in this sense.

7. Prescription :

The nature of prescription has already been explained, and a distinction was then drawn between acquistive prescription, which is a title to rights, and extinctive prescription, which merely extinguishes the preexisting right; the right extinguished by prescription in the case of obligations is not the obligation itself, but merely the right of action upon it; it is the remedial not the antecedent right which ceases to exist. A right which has become unenforceable because action upon it is barred by lapse of time furnishes an 90 example of an imperfect right or natural obligation.

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Another classification of obligations

Classification of obligations distinguishes those which are civil from those which are natural, the natural obligation being one which is not enforceable by action. It consists, therefore, of an imperfect right and duty. Another classification of greater importance is based upon the nature of the acts and forbearances forming the content of the right and duty of which the obligation cinsists.

from this point of view From this point distinguished as either binding a person to something, to do something, or not to do something

The classification adopted by the Egyptian Codes divided them according to their sources. Three classes are there distinguished, namely, obligations arising from agreement, obligations arising from an act or event, and obligations arising from a rule of law.

In a strict sense all obligations are, of course, crcated by the law, but there is a distinction between those which the law enforces as recognizing the will of the parties directs to their creation and those which owe their existence to the law alone. That is to say, some come into existence without breach of any pre-existing right, and others are only created by the law to sanction a breack of right. Those arising from contract are clearly due to the recognition by the law of the will of the parties directed to their formation, while those arising from delict (or quasidelict) as clearly belong to the class of obligations imposed by the law irrespective of the parties will

There remains a mass of obligations as ords the proper classification of some of which considerable doubt exists. This class includes

quasi-contractual obligations, obligations arising from a trust or waqf, the obligation to pay alimony,and so on.

It will be well in the first place to discuss distinction between contractual and delictual obligations.

Contractual and delictual obligations : write what do you know about

A contract was there defined as an agreement giving rise to rights in personam. The obligations arising from contract itself. Certain special contracts in general use call, indeed, for separate treatment in all systems of law. Of these the most important are sale, lease, hire, loan, and agency.

The obligation which arises on a contract is antecedent in character. If Mohamed agrees to build a house for Houssam he is performing his legal duty and fulfilling Houssams legal right in

for carrying out the operations necessary constructing the house. Should he fail to perform his duty he will commit a breach of right which may be termed a wrong, The wrong is in that case breach of a pre-existing contractual right. The commission of the wrong gives rise to a remedial right on the part of the person wrong

It often happens, that a person commits a legal wrong by failing to perform a duty which did not arise from contract. Such duties are imposed by the law and may be in personum as owing to determinate persons or in rem as owing to the community at large. The class of duties in personum created by the law failing within the category of obligations will be considered later. The case we are now considering is that of the breach of an antecedent duty in rem. Such a breach is a wrong, but it is a wrong independent of contract. No personal relation existed between the parties previous to the breach of right.

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A wrong independent of contract is termed a delict or quasi-delict, and the obligation to which it gives rise is delictual or quasidelictual. The distinction between contractual obligation therefore clear, the former being antecedent in character and arising from agreement, while the latter is remedial and springs from a breach of a pre-existing non-contractual right.

The attention is now directed to both contractual and delictual wrongs. Differences exist between their effects because the rights broken in each case are different in character, not, as is sometimes suggested, because delict does not presuppose an antecedent right.

There is a certain moral implication in the terms used in this part of our subject.

"Fault" and "wrong imply moral condemnation. They suggest that the breach of right might have been and ought to have been avoided. This might

that liability both lead to supposition

the contractual and delictual is founded on personal delinquency, but at the present day it is certainly not true as regards contractual liability and only partially true in the case of delicts.

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to show any delinquency on the part of the defendant. In the case of delicts, however, the opposite rule is laid own; delict fault is not presumed, but must be proved. This is supposed to indicate a radical  difference between contractual and delictual liability. It is remebered that a delict is always the breach of some pre-existing right, it must be clear that proof of a breach is necessary in order to establish delictual liability. In most cases the right in question is not a right to absolute immunity from damage, but only to immunity from damage wilfully inflicted or arising from negligence.

Art 1385 of the French Civil Code makes the owner of an animal liable for damage done by the such cases fault is said to be animal, and in presumed. What is implied by this presumption is a matter of controversy, according to many writers the owner is liable whatever care may have been taken to avoid the damage. He can, however, admittedly escape liability by proving that the damage resulted from force majeure, but this would not prevent it being true to say that his liability was independent of any moral falut on his part.

However this may be, it is at least clear that the legislature has expressly made certain persons liable in damages as insures against certain kinds of accident, independent of fault. Thus both France and in England employers are liable.

comparisation for injury suffered by their workman in the

course of their employment even though the acciuch was not the result of any negligence on the part of the employer. And some contend that t principle of insurance ought to be extended so as to cover all cases of damage done by the acts of others independent of the existence or non-existence of "fault".

It is not, indeed, possible to discover any absolute principle which will enable us to mark off acts which constitute deliects from those which although causing damage will yet not give rise to liability. The public interest demands that, within certain vaguely defined limits, men should be left free to employ their power as they please and to make such use of their property as seems good to them.' The rights to protection against the acts of others accorded by the law are not infringed by acts which fall within these limits, ever though such acts may be done with the intention of causing damage. If Ahmed builds a factory upon his land which entirely spoils the amenity of the neighbourhood and depreciates the value of Hausam's adjoining property, this gives Housam no right to claim compensation for the damage done, even though Ahmed may have well known the injury the factory would do and may even have desired to do the injury out of hatred to Houssam. Workmen who strike work , tradesmen who start rival shops, and so on, all do damage to others, and do it intentionally, yet their action is no cause of liability. Each system of law will draw the delicate houndary line between lawful and unlawful damage at the slightly different point, but at some point a line must necessarily be drawn. naung di

It remains to point out that the rule that he who does an act through another is himself liable, is expressly applied by French and Egyptian law to the commission of delicts, a master being responsible for the acts of his servant when done in the course of his employment. This liability is, in fact, no more than an application of the ordinary rules of agency.

Contractual and delictual obligations compte the bulk of the obligations met with in everyday The classes of antecedent obligations which remain are of a more exceptional character. These obligations will be here discussed under four heads,

it wit :

1. Obligations arising from a trust or wagf,

2. Quasi-contractual obligation,

 3. Obligations annexed by the law to domestic

status.

4. Public obligations imposed by the law.

1. Obligations arising from trust or waqf:

The essential characteristic of the trust and of the waqf is that the trustee or nazir is bound by law to administer the property subjected to the trust for the benefit not of the persons for whom it was instituted. There is an obligation existing between the trustee and the beneficiary which consists in a duty laid upon the trustee towards the beneficiary and a corresponding right against the trustee on the part of the beneficiary. enero bem

In the case of a private trust or waqf the beneficiary who holds the right is a private person, while when the trust is of a public character, we ay regard the class of persons for whose benefit it was instituted as the persons entitled, or possibly in some cases the state as representing the common interests of the community.

Now the special peculiarity of trust obligations is that they exist independent of an contract made between the trustee and the beneficiary. When, for example, a person creates a waqf or trust for the benefit of his descendants, the descendants as they come into existence become holders of rights enforceable against the trustee or nazir which entitle them to have the property administered for their benefit. Yet these rights do not arise from a contract between them and the trustee. Sed

It is sometimes said that such trust obligations arise from the law, and they are thus differentiated from contractual obligations which arise from the will of the panties. Their creation does not indeed demand any consensus of will on the part of the person bound and the person entitled; the trustee owes a duty to the beneficiary though he has never agreed with the beneficiary that he will owe such a duty, and the beneficiary is entitled to a right against the trustee though he has never agreed

with the trustee to that effect. Nevertheless, the law does not create such obligations except as recognizing the will of private individuals directed to their formation. The obligation be ween the trustee and the beneficiary does not exist in virtue of a general rule of law, but is the efect of the specific recognition by the law of the will of the founder seeking to benefit third parties, coupled perhaps with that of the trustee, who by acceptance of the trust, expresses his willingness to undertake the duties thereof. It is a generally acknowledged rule that the legal effects of a contract are confined to the contracting parties. warteoainee 

2. Quasi-contractual obligations :

Quasi-contractual obligations, arise whenever the law implies an obligation, not in recognition of an agreement, but as the result of an act which normally would be done in compliance with an agreement.

Quasi-contractual obligations are classified by the Egyptian codes with dilictual obligations as arising from an act of event”.

The commonest instances of this class of

obligations are two in number :

property 1. when a perons voluntarily renders some necessary service to property or business in the absence of the owner, an act which may give rise to a duty of indemnification on the part of the owner and to one of completing his service on the part of the person who has undertaken it.

 2. When a person pays money not really due the resulting obligation here being one of repayment by the payee.

Regarded as a statement of legal principle this maxim shares the defects of other similar maxims. It lacks precision, but it serves to express a broad rule of legal justice of which many examples are to be found in all systems. It is because they result in the enrichment of one person at the expense of another such situations is held to give rise to legal liability, and the language in which the Civil code establishes the claim to indemnity on the part of the person who has acted for the benefit of another itself shows that this is the basis of his claim the act of one person intentionally procuring a benefit for another binds that other person to account for any expenses, ... etc.".

But apart from these cases in which express vi provision is made by the law for restitution based

son enrichissment. The modern French & Egyptian vir jurisprudence seem inclined to admit that in all o cases in which the facts warrant it the person

unjustifiably enriched at another's expense is liable to an action at the suit of the person at whose expense he was enriched for the purpose of making

good the latter's loss up to the amount of the gain which the former has secured.

3. Obligations arising from domestic status :

in the Civil Code, a chapter is added which purports to treat obligations "created by the law".

The only obligation mentioned under this latter head is that of making alimentary provision for relatives imposed upon members of the same family. The occurrence of rules upon this subject in the Civil Code is curious, since the subject belongs properly to the Personal Statuts. Nor do the articles in question correctly state the Islamic law upon the subject. It is difficult to see why the Egyptian legislator has gone out of his way to create a special class to cover a particular species of obligation which does not fall within the purview of the Civil

us alimony

Code. In the French Civil Code the rules alimony are placed under the law of persons (family law). This is, no doubt, the more convenient place for its treatment. The obligation to pay alimony is rightly regarded as imposed by a rule of law rather than as created in deference to the specific will of the parties.n

sa asd Tool or noir

4. Public obligations :

Of obligations imposed by the law upon citizens as a whole and consisting of duties owed to the state, we may cite as example the duty to pay taxes (P) and to serve in the army. silon

Joint and several obligations :

Each system of law has its own methods of working out the sequences of such joint holding in the various forms which it may take.

Obligations solidaires occur when two or more persons are jointly bound or jointly entitled to the same thing but by separate obligations. Though each debtor is bound to the creditor for the whole sum, yet as between the debtors themselves each is. only liable for his share. Consequently, if one pays the whole he has a right of recourse against the others to obtain repayment to him of the shares of the debt due from them.

The solidary character of the obligation may result from agreement or from special provision of the law. Thus the civil code provides that delictual obligations shall be joint and several. The Egyptian code have here innovated and specially provide that, in the absence of a stipulation for joint and several liability or circumstances which make such a stipulation implicit, the creditor has no right of action against the sureties except for their respective shares tha

When, as in the case just mentioned, a creditor cannot sue any one of the debtors for the whole of 'the debt, there is not really a joint obligation at all.

In French law; when several persons are together bound for payment of a debt, but each is liable only for his share, the obligation is said to be "conjoints".

When in the code we find that an obligation is expressly stated not to be joint and implication is that it is "Conjointe".

Although the examples above given debtors jointly and severally liable, it is of course,

and possible to conceive of creditors jointly severally entitled, in which case any one of the creditors is competent to sue separately and to give a receipt for the whole debt. This situation is often termed Active Solidarity to distinguish it from joint and several liability to which the "epithet” Passive Solidarity is applied.

Egyptian law regards joint and several debtors and creditors as reciprocal agents for each other in all dealings in connection with the debt and applies the rules of agency to govem their mutual relations. The detailed explanation of the operation of this principle cannot be entered into here. It suffices to say that, as between creditors solidarily entitled, it places the creditor who sues, or who receives payment, in the position of the representative of the others, to whom he is consequently liable to account for what he receiven. The Egyptian code lays down that " when the performance of an obligation cannot, whether in the nature of things

in view of the purpose of the obligation, be divided, each of the debtors is liable for the whole, subject to his right of recourse against his codebtors"

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Qualities of object in obligations to transfer 1

a. Existence of the thing to be transferred :

Although in the Egyptian law the delivery and not the thing to be delivered is the object, yet seeing that there can be no delivery without a thing to be delivered, the existence of the thing is essential in the Egyptian law as in the French law. When there is an obligation to deliver a specific thing . The thing must be in existence at the date of the contract or the obligation is void for want of an object. But this will not be so when the parties intended to transfer a future thing. If on the other hand, they deal with one another on the footing that the thing existed and it turns out that it did not exist, there is no contract but only the appearance of a contract.

b. Future successions :

The sale of rights under a succession to the estate of a living person is void, even if he consents to the sale while still living.

c. Object must be determinate as to his and quality :

In addition to being an object of commer the object of an obligation must be determinate at least as its kind, and its quality according to the circumstances.

Under the Egyptian code, the property does not pass to the buyer until the things sold have been separated from the bulk by weighing, counting as the case may be, and have actually been delivered to him.

d. Possibility of transfer:

It must be possible to transfer the thing from one of the parties to the other. There can be no valid obligation by A to transfer a thing to B if this is an impossible thing to do it, for example, A sells to B a thing unknown to both of them and have not belonged to B, the sale is void for want of an object:

1. The object must be possible :

In saying as the code do, that object must be possible it is me

possible it is meant that there can be no Jawful obligation to perform a thing which is absolutely impossible for anyone to perform and relative impossibility is not enough. If a man binds himself to do something which is a possible thing to do, although he is not able to do it, there is no reason why he should not pay damages for entering into so foolish a contract.

2. The object must be lawful :

A promise to do anything which is forbiden by law cannot be enforced and we may say that both the cause and the object are here unlawful. Or another way of reaching the same result is to say that an unlawful act cannot be an object of commerce. It is necessary that the act should be expressly forbidden; if the promise is to do something unlawful or immoral it will not be enforced.

3. The object must be personal to the debtor:

By this is meant that it is only a person who has given his consent to be bound by a contract who is bound by it. If A undertakes that Ba do something, then unless he had B's au to act for him, B is not bound. Nor is Ab either, because he did not undertake to do anything. But there is nothing to prevent an agreement that if B does not do what A has undertaken that he shall, or at any rate that if B does not take over the obligation and agree to be bound, he A, will pay the damages.

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4.The creditor must have an interest n enforcing the contract : obo

It is a fundamental rule of procedure that the plaintiff must have interest in the result of the suit, otherwise, the performance demand will be rejected. walau ser

Scope of the law of obligation :

It may be said that obligations fall under the head of rights and duties in personam and that it is only. proprietary rights and duties of this class which are generally covered by obligation exists between two persons when

the term or its equivalent is cwing from one to the sons when money to the other,

rights and duties in personam which do not ose or diminish the holder's estate do not fall within the sphere of obligations. Thus the duty of respect and obedience which a son owes to his father is outside the sphere of obligations, but the son's duty to provide the father which alimony is within it. It is true that the term is sometimes broadly used to cover all rights and duties in personam, but such a usage is to be avoided.

Strictly speaking, it is the abstract idea of the legal tie or bond uniting the person of inherence with the person incidence which is designated by the term obligation. The word is, however, sometimes used to signify the right claimed.

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